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COMMENTS
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW YORK NEGLIGENCE LAW
The common law has always exhibited a facility to adapt itself to the fluc-
tuating philosophy and requirements of the age. Its development has followed
the times, but, more often than not, change has been studied, deliberate, and
delayed so that rash ideas might be exposed to reason and eperience. "Perhaps
more than any other branch of the law, the law of torts is a battleground of
social theory."' New York courts in particular have seemed to move more
slowly than other jurisdictions in the field of negligence law. Recent decisions
by the court of appeals indicate, however, a definite trend to extend the rules
of liability.
IlPACT No LONGER NECESSARY
Sixty-five years ago, in Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 2 the court of appeals estab-
lished the rule that in the absence of physical impact a plaintiff could not recover
for injuries suffered as the result of fright negligently caused by the defendant.
The decision, based on an English case? and on an excellent example of non
sequitur,4 relied mainly on public policy:
If the right of recovery in this class of cases should be once established, it would
naturally result in a flood of litigation in cases where the injury complained of may
be easily feigned without detection, and where the damages must rest upon mere
conjecture or speculation. . . . To establish such a doctrine would be contrary to
principles of public policy.5
Some impact was demanded as the touchstone of genuineness to deter spurious
claims.
Although the rule of Mitchel had been weakened by many exceptions,0
ridiculed by most legal scholars,7 and repudiated by many other jurisdic-
1. Proser, Torts 12 (2d ed. 1955).
2. 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1S96). The plaintiff was a pregnant woman who was
waiting to board one of defendant's horse-drawn trolleys when another came charging
wildly down the street at her. The rearing horses were stopped inches from the petrified
woman. In fact, when the horses halted, she was between the heads of the two lead hones.
Plaintiff then fainted, was hospitalized, and subsequently suffered a miscarriage. The court
held that since she had not been touched but only frightened by the negligent operation
of the defendant, she had no cause of action.
3. Victorian Rys. Comm'rs v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222 (P.C. 1S$3), overruled by
Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901] 2 K.B. 669.
4. Since "fright cannot form the basis of an action, it is obvious that no recovery can
be had for injuries resulting therefrom." 151 N.Y. at 109, 45 N.E. at 354.
S. Id. at 110, 45 N.E. at 354-55.
6. See McNiece, Psychic Injury and Tort Liability in New York, 24 St. John's L. Rev.
1, 33-65 (1949) for details of eight exceptions.
7. See Bohlen, Right to Recover for Injury Resulting from Negligence Without Impact,
50 U. Pa. L. Rev. 141 (1902); Campbell, Injury Without Impact, 1951 Ins. LJ. 654;
Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 Alich. L. Rev. 497 (1922); Hallen,
Damages for Physical Injuries Resulting From Fright or Shock, 19 Va. L. Rev. 253 (1933);
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tions,s it was not until this year that the New York Court of Appeals specifically
overruled it. Battalla v. New York9 allowed a cause of action wherein the
claimant alleged "severe emotional and neurological disturbances with residual
physical manifestations." Recognizing the speculative nature of such damages
and the possibility of increased fraudulent claims, Judge Burke, speaking for
the court, observed:
In the difficult cases, we must look to the quality and genuineness of proof, and
rely to an extent on the contemporary sophistication of the medical profession and
the ability of the court and jury to weed out the dishonest claims. Claimant should,
therefore, be given an opportunity to prove that her injuries were proximately caused
by defendant's negligence.' 0
It is noteworthy that the trial court in Battalla" cited the fairly recent
"cancerophobia" case of Ferrara v. Galluchio12 in denying the motion to dis-
miss. In Ferrara, the defendant, an X-ray specialist, negligently burned the
claimant who was undergoing treatment. The physical damage was slight, but,
when told by a dermatologist that the burn might cause cancer, the plaintiff
allegedly suffered severe mental anguish for which she sought damages. The
wrongdoer was held liable for all the mental suffering which resulted naturally
from the physical injury.13
Although qualifying under the impact rule, the Ferrara claim was actually
more vulnerable to attack than the claim in Mitchell, where the foreseeability
and proximity of cause were more reasonable.' 4 If advances in medical science
can offer proof that the present injury of the claimant was the result of emo-
tional shock or disturbance induced by the defendant, it is only just, that the
trier of fact should decide whether the proof was sufficient.15 In this vein it
Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbances in the Law of Torts, 49 Harv. L, Rev.
1033 (1936); McNiece, Psychic Injury and Tort Liability in New York, 24 St. John's
L. Rev. 1 (1949); Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for
Psychic Stimuli, 30 Va. L. Rev. 193 (1944); Throckmorton, Damages for Fright, 34 Harv.
L. Rev. 260 (1920); Wilson, The New York Rule as to Nervous Shock, 11 Cornell L.Q.
512 (1926).
8. See McNiece, supra note 7 at 15; Note, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 113, 138 (1947).
9. 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961); See Note, 30 Fordham
L. Rev. 199 (1961).
10. Id. at 242, 176 N.E.2d at 731-32, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 38.
11. 17 Misc. 2d 548, 184 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
12. 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1958).
13. Following the Mitchell rule, once the immediate physical injury is proven, claimant
is allowed to recover damages not only for the physical injury itself and the pain and
suffering attendant thereon, but also for the mental anguish such as fright or shock pro-
duced by his emotional response.
14. The time interval between the negligence of the defendant and the alleged mental
anguish was much greater in Ferrara and might allow more time for fraudulent scheming.
15. See Klimas v. Trans Caribbean Airways, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 209, 176 N.E.2d 714,
219 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1961) where the court held, in a workman's compensation proceeding,
that death from a heart attack occasioned solely by mental disturbances and emotional
strain resulting from employment was compensable. Note, 30 Fordham L. Rev. 385 (1961).
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would seem that the rule in Battalla would be equally logical if the requirement
that psychic damage be accompanied by "residual physical manifestations" was
deleted. The problem would still be one of fact.
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PRENATAL INJURIES
The advance of medicine has also been responsible for New York courts
recognizing as valid the claim of an infant for injuries sustained, while en ventre
sa mere, as a result of the negligence of someone other than its parent.10 In
Woods v. Lancet,17 the court of appeals for the first time'8 allowed such a suit
provided that the foetus be viable at the time of the injury, and that it later
be born alive. Barely two years later, in 1953, the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court extended the Woods decision by omitting the requirement that,
at the time of the injury, the foetus be capable of e-xtrauterine existence.' This
was the first case which sustained a cause of action for prepartutn injuries to a
non-viable embryo. It heeded the light of findings by modern embryologists
that the human embryo is in esse and biologically separable from its mother
from the time of its conception. -' The decision was consistent with New York
Decedent Estate Law2' and Penal Code2 both of which recognize that a non-
viable foetus has a legal personality.
In this line of cases, the role of medical progress is extremely crucial, but as
yet not too advanced. The difficulty lies in tracing the connection between the
negligence of the defendant and whatever abnormality is suffered by the new-
born baby. Very little is known of the causes of congenital abnormalities;3
many interrelated factors are known to be involved somehow, but usually one
expert theory is as good as another. The younger the embryo, the greater is
the problem of tracing causation. Yet, as in cases of injury from purely psychic
sources, should a legal right be denied from the outset merely because the
causal connection is difficult to prove? Perhaps, as in several other states,24 the
16. As to a parent, a child has no cause of action for personal injuries negligently in-
flicted. Sorrentino v. Sorrentino, 24S N.Y. 626, 162 N.E. 551 (1923).
17. 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951).
13. The leading American case for denial of action for prenatal injuries was Dietrich
v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 133 lass. 14, 52 Am. Rep. 242 (1894). In New York,
Woods overruled Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921).
19. Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (3d Dep't 1953). For dis-
cussion of this case see Note, 39 Cornell L.Q. 542 (1954); Note, 23 Fordham L. Rev. 217
(1954); Note, 29 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1154 (1954).
20. Griesheimer, Physiology and Anatomy 738 (5th ed. 1945); Patten, Human Embry-
ology 181 (1946).
21. N.Y Dec. Est. Law § 83(12) (descendant or distributee of decedent, begotten
before decedent's death but born thereafter, shall take in same manner as if he were born
within decedent's lifetime and had survived him).
22. N.Y. Penal Law § 1050 (the vilful killing of an unborn quick child by injury
committed on the person of the mother is manslaughter in first degree); N.Y. Penal Law
§§ 80, 81 (vilful abortion, not to save mother or child, is a felony).
23. See Patten, Human Embryology 227-32 (1946).
24. At least nine states have allowed recovery for the wrongful death of a stillborn
19611
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New York requirement of a "quick birth" will also be discarded, thereby al-
lowing an administrator to recover under wrongful death statutes if the foetus
would have had a cause of action at birth.
THE BLASTING RULE
In Schlansky v. Riegel, InC., 2 5 the New York rule concerning damage caused
by blasting was once again reviewed. The plaintiffs owned homes which were
damaged by vibration and concussion from the blasting operations of the defen-
dant's construction work on an adjacent lot. The trial court set aside a plain-
tiffs' jury verdict for failure of proof, but ordered new trials. The appellate
division held the deficiency in proof required dismissal of the complaints:
Such owner is not liable for damage to his neighbors' structures caused by a concus-
sion generated by the blasting, in the absence of proof of negligence in the per-
formance of the blasting. Despite the injury to neighboring property, such blasting,
without proof of negligence, is damnum absque injuria. This rule is based upon the
public policy of promoting "the building up of towns and cities and the improvement
of property. '26
The plaintiffs pressed for a "reexamination and reappraisal of the New York
case law which imposes strict liability for blasting damage when there is physical
trespass but insists on proof of negligence in the blasting when no flying debris
is cast onto a plaintiff's premises." 27 The court of appeals deftly sidestepped
the request to bring New York into line with the "almost universally" held
rule that a blaster is absolutely liable for any damage he causes.2 8 Referring to
the rather slim evidence on the record, the court found that there was enough
to establish a prima facie case which the defendant had failed to rebut, and
hence, it reinstated the jury verdict.
Schlansky forbears the conclusion that New York is not yet willing to go "all
all the way" to absolute liability against blasters, but, given a case wherein
there is no evidence of negligence presented, other than the damage by concus-
sion or vibration, it is very likely that the burden will be placed on the blaster
to prove the absence of negligence on his part. In short, the concussion damage
will probably be sufficient to establish a prima facie case.
infant resulting from prepartum injuries. See Prates v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 19 Conn.
Sup. 487, 118 A.2d 633 (Super. CL 1955); Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc., 50 Dcl. 258,
128 A.2d 557 (1956) ; Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955) ; Mitchell
v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955); Valence v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 50 So. 2d
847 (La. 1951); Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949); Ralney v.
Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So. 2d 434 (1954); Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135
A.2d 249 (1957); Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959).
25. 9 N.Y.2d 493, 174 N.E.2d 730, 215 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1961).
26. 11 App. Div. 2d 787, 788, 205 N.Y.S.2d 154, 157 (2d Dep't 1960).




The New York Court of Appeals, in Greenberg v. Lorcnz?. 3 while acknowl-
edging that there can be no warranty without privity, held that "at least as to
food and household goods, the presumption should be that the purchase was
made for all the members of the household."30
This decision brings New York into accord with the prevailing view.31 After
carefully tracing the history of food warranty cases in New York, and listing a
partial bibliography of the many attacks on its unfair restriction to the pur-
chaser, Chief Judge Desmond noted significantly that "about 20 States have
abolished such requirements of privity the latest being Virginia and New Jer-
sey. ' 32 Both the Virginia and New Jersey cases, of which the court vrote,
involved defendant manufacturers rather than food retailers or processors. The
case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Inc.P went so far as to impose
strict liability in an automobile case in the absence of privity. Hence, it is rea-
sonable to revive Judge Cardozo's observation that "the assault on the citadel
of privity is proceeding in these days apace."3 1 While New York, until now,
has not joined fully in the attack on privity, other than in the sphere of food
and drug warranty,a5 the broad dicta in Greenbcrgo and the allowance of the
cause of action in Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp.7 are strong indications
that the court may be ready to discard the doctrine as unsound and unjust
under contemporary marketing circumstances.
IMMUNITY FOR CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS ENDED
The court in Greenberg was well aware of its power to reexmine, and per-
haps revise, outworn case law.38 As two recent examples of such corrections, it
cited Woods v. Laneet,30 and Bing v. Thunig.:0 In the latter, the New York
29. 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961).
30. Id. at 2C0, 173 N.E.2d at 776, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 42.
31. See Prosser, Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 Yale
L.J. 1099 (1960) for an excellent study of the status of immunity due to lack of privity.
The Uniform Commercial Code § 2-31S extends the retailers warranty to all members
of the buyer's household.
32. Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 199, 173 N.E.2d 773, 775, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39,
41 (1961).
33. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). See Note, 29 Fordham L. Rev. 133 (1960).
34. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, ISO, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (1931) (Cardozo,
CJ.).
35. The rule for drugs has always gone along with that for food. E.g., Thomas v.
Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (1852).
36. 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961).
37. 305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421 (1953).
33. "But the present rule which we are being asked to modify is itself of judicial
making since our statutes say nothing at all about privity and in early times such liabilities
were thought to be in tort.... Alteration of the law in such matters has been the bud-
ness of the New York courts for many years. .. ." 9 N.Y.2d at 199-200, 173 N.E.2d at
775, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 42.
39. 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951).
40. 2 N..2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957).
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court finally overruled the last vestiges of the ancient dogma that charitable
institutions were immune from liability due to the negligence of their em-
ployees. 41 The court swept aside the fanciful division of patient care into
"administrative" as opposed to "medical,"' 42 and determined, realistically, that
the patient comes to the hospital to be treated and cured. The patient does not
come there, as to a hiring hall, to select independent contractors; he puts his
confidence in the hospital as the instrument through which help will come. Hence,
the hospital should be held liable to the same extent as any other employer for
its employees' negligence. This was but another instance where changing con-
ditions43 required a new approach to what had been a settled issue. As Judge
Fuld said, the courts must revise those of its decisions which are "out of tune
with the life about us, at variance with modern-day needs and with concepts
of justice and fair dealing." 4
CONCLUSION
In the recent past, the courts of New York have made some major renova-
tions in the field of negligence law. Apart from the fact that the trend swings
New York into line with the majority, much can be said for the courts' logic.
The idea common to all these changes is that liability should follow closely upon
negligence.
Advances in medical science have permitted new causes of action to arise,
and have gone far in eliminating serious problems in those previously existing
-notably, the establishment of the causal connection in, and the degree of, men-
tal and prenatal injuries. With further medical developments certain, the law
must continue to progress to keep pace.
In blasting and warranty cases, 45 New York is still lagging behind other juris-
41. Prosser, Torts 785 (2d ed. 1955) describes "the rather curious New York theory
that a charity merely furnishes the facilities for services rendered by individuals, assuming
no responsibility except for the selection of competent persons, who are therefore to be
considered independent actors or contractors."
42. Schloendorff v. Society of the New York Hosp. 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914)
(hospital liable for "administrative" negligence of its employees, but immunity granted
for "medical" negligence).
43. The development of liability insurance, whereby hospitals could protect themselves
and spread the cost over many, was one such condition which made the immunity doctrine
more unreasonable. Prosser, Law of Torts 786 (2d ed. 1955).
44. Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 667, 143 N.E.2d 3, 9, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 11 (1957).
The leading American case to deal the fatal blow to immunity for charitable hospitals,
and with which New York is now in accord, is Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d
810 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
45. "It is just as unfair to hold liable a retail grocery man, as here, who Is innocent of
any negligence or wrong, on the theory of breach of warranty, for some defect in a
canned product which he could not inspect and with the production of which he had
nothing to do, as it is to deny relief to one who has no relationship to the contract of
purchase and sale, though eating at the purchaser's table. As Justice Steuer aptly observed
at the Appellate Term, 'it may be odd that the purchaser can recover while others cannot,
but it is odder still that one without fault has to pay at all.'" 9 N.Y.2d at 201, 173
N.E.2d at 776, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 43 (Froessel, J., concurring).
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